

MILITARY CONSCRIPTION, SEXIST ATTITUDES, AND INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE

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Military Conscription, Sexist Attitudes, and Intimate Partner Violence*

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Abstract

We provide empirical evidence on the long-term causal impact of military conscription on sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence. To address potential endogeneity, we exploit the conscription draft lottery in Argentina. We combine the draft administrative data with self-reported survey data. We find that conscription causes men to embrace more sexist attitudes in dimensions such as justification of sexism and violence, sexual machismo, negative attitude towards homosexuality, old-fashioned sexism, and hostile sexism. We also find that men who served are more likely to self-report engagement in intimate partner violence, as measured by non-physical abuse and physical violence.

Keywords: Military service; sexism; physical violence; non-physical abuse.

JEL classification: K42.

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I. Introduction

We provide empirical evidence on the long-term causal effect of military conscription on men's self-reported sexist attitudes and behaviors. Our identification strategy exploits the conscription lottery in Argentina that, for almost all of the twentieth century, randomly assigned eligibility of all young males to military conscription based on the last three numbers of their national ID. Compared to observational studies, our estimates are not biased by the fact that certain types of men are more likely than others to service in military conscription.

We combine conscription lottery administrative data with self-reported survey data on sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence. We first report that men who served are more likely to embrace sexist attitudes in dimensions such as justification of sexism and violence, sexual machismo, negative attitude towards homosexuality, old fashioned sexism, and hostile sexism. We then take a step further to see if these sexist attitudes are associated with sexist behaviors, and we find that conscripted men are more likely to self-report engagement in intimate-partner violence, as measured by non-physical abuse and physical violence.

Military conscription is one of the most widespread policies around the world, affecting men typically in early adulthood.¹ Given the vast numbers of people who go through military indoctrination during their formative years, our findings are important to understand the potential effects of military conscription on the formation of sexist attitudes and related behaviors for a sizeable proportion of world's population. Our results suggest a systemic source of misogynistic attitudes and violent behavior – and one that is state-supported, making it particularly insidious.

¹ Nowadays, 35 percent of nations have military conscription. Although the age of service varies among different countries, most commonly men are conscripted between the ages of 18 and 20.

Our paper lies in the intersection between two previous studies that exploit the Argentine conscription lottery. Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsy (2011) find that conscripted men are more likely to develop a criminal record during adulthood, especially for crimes against property and white collar crimes. They do not provide any evidence on crimes related to intimate partner violence. Compared to theirs, our results may be capturing some personal features and behaviors that in more extreme forms and for a much smaller proportion of individuals may also be expressed as involvement in criminal activities. Ertola Navajas et al. (2020) find that being conscripted increases the likelihood of adopting a military mindset. In particular, they report men who were conscripted are less tolerant, more disciplined, more politically conservative, more authoritarian, and more belligerent. Our paper is the second paper to estimate effects on beliefs. We add an important dimension on beliefs, sexist attitudes, and we also explore how these attitudes translate into related behaviors such as intimate partner violence.

Our research also relates to the literature that studies the impact of military conscription in other countries and on a wide set of outcomes, including criminal behavior (Siminski, Ville, and Paull 2016; Albaek et al. 2017; Lyk-Jensen 2018) and participation in the labor market (Paloyo 2010; Grenet, Hart, and Roberts 2011; Bauer et al. 2012; Card and Cardoso 2012).

There is also an important amount of research, starting with Angrist (1990), which exploits the Vietnam-era draft lottery to identify the causal effects of military service on a number of outcomes. More recently, Cesur and Sabia (2016) examine the effect of combat service on domestic violence using a natural experiment in overseas deployment assignment among active-duty servicemen. They find that assignment to combat substantially increases the probability of intimate partner violence and child

abuse. Examining potential channels, they report that exposed groups have higher posttraumatic stress disorder, suicidal ideation, psychological stress, and substance abuse. Previous research has also shown that psychological costs of combat exposure can be rather substantial (Cesur, Sabia, and Tekin 2013). Of course, combat exposure may have different impacts on a person's mental and physical health compared to peacetime conscription. In general, an important difference between our paper and this literature is that combat exposure is likely to be a very different intervention vis a vis peacetime conscription.

Various authors compare the pro-military values of individuals who are in (or planning to follow) a military career against individuals who do not. Goertzel and Hengst (1971) compare Army Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) cadets with undergraduate students and find that Army cadets score higher on personality scales measuring authoritarianism, misanthropy, intolerance, aggressive nationalism, political-economic conservatism, and belief in imperialism. More recently, Jackson et al. (2012) report that people lower in agreeableness and openness to experience are more likely to enter the military. Closer to our paper, Dahl, Kotsadam, and Rooth (2021) document that those with less gender-equal attitudes select into military service. An obvious drawback of these studies is that people self-select into the military service. Our approach avoids selection problems by exploiting a well-documented random assignment. To the best of our knowledge, our paper represents the first effort to identify the causal effect of military conscription on sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence.

There is a related psychology literature that focuses on the positive link between sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence. Sakalli (2001) shows that men who score high on hostile sexism view wife-beating as being acceptable and blame women for

eliciting domestic violence. Glick et al. (2002) report a positive correlation between sexism (either hostile or benevolent) and attitudes that legitimize abuse.

Finally, our study also relates to the literature that looks at the long-term impacts of events that occur during the impressionable years (for example, Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011; Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014; Cantoni et al. 2017). In line with this literature, our paper shows that major events experienced during early adulthood have life-long effects.

II. Military culture and sexism

Our paper focuses on the impact of military conscription on sexist attitudes and behaviors. The study of this link is motivated by the role that conscription may have in the socialization process that influences and shape masculine role definitions, attitudes, and related behaviors. Even though the military organization may have changed in recent years in their image regarding sexism, the analysis of the effect of military training should focus on the traditional processes and images of masculinity upon which the system is based (Arkin and Dobrofsky 1978).

Despite some idiosyncratic differences across countries, the purely masculine surroundings of the military and the values associated with the virility ideal play a determining role in molding soldiers' self-image (Elkin 1946). Mechanisms of social control are constantly operating to reinforce the appropriate masculine self-image by negating menaces (like showing emotions) or threats (like homosexuality) to that image.²

² According to Williams and Weinberg (1971), the official reasons given by the army and the navy for fearing homosexuals are that "(T)he Army considers homosexuals to be unfit for military service because their presence impairs the morale and discipline of the Army, and that homosexuality is a manifestation of a severe personality defect which appreciably limits the ability of such individuals to function effectively in society... Homosexuals and other sexual deviates are military liabilities that cannot be tolerated in a military organization."

Several studies provide evidence on the differences in sexist attitudes between the military and the general population. For example, in a recent study, Dahl, Kotsadam, and Rooth (2021) use data from Norway to compare attitudes related to traditional gender roles between military recruits and the general population. They report that men in the military have less gender-egalitarian attitudes compared to the general population, and conclude that males with less gender-equal attitudes select into military service.

The differences in sexist attitudes between the military and the general population may explain the observed differences in prevalence rates of intimate partner violence between these two groups. Prevalence rates of intimate partner violence among active-duty servicemen and veterans range from 13.5% to 58% (Marshall, Panuzio, and Taft 2005). These relatively high rates are sometimes rationalized as explained by possible over-representation of specific forms of psychopathology. However, studies using military samples not selected on the basis of psychopathology find intimate partner violence perpetration rates that are one to three times higher than rates found in studies of the general population (Straus and Gelles 1990; Marshall, Panuzio, and Taft 2005).

III. Military conscription in Argentina

Masculine military conscription in Argentina was mandatory from 1901 to 1994, when it was abolished.³ Our analysis focuses on cohorts born between 1958 and 1975.⁴ Males in these cohorts served at age 18. That is, they were eligible to serve in the period 1976 to 1994, and thus our empirical analysis identifies the long-term effects of being exposed to military conscription.

³ From 1901 to 1976, males were conscripted at the age of 21; later, this was modified to age 18. The cohort born in 1955 was the last to serve at age 21, and the cohort born in 1958 was the first to serve at age 18.

⁴ A small proportion of recruits from the cohorts born in 1962 and 1963 participated in the Malvinas War. As reported in Table A1 in the Appendix, the main results are robust to excluding the cohorts born in 1962 and 1963.

The length of service was at least one year in the Army and the Air Force, and up to two years in the Navy. These services began with a three-month instruction period where recruits learned military norms and were exposed to military training. Following the initial training, conscripts were allocated to a military unit to perform a specific duty, which not necessarily involved military tasks.⁵

The eligibility of young males for military service was determined through a lottery and based on the last 3 digits of their national IDs, a unique lifelong number assigned to every citizen at age 16 for the cohorts in our study. Each year a public lottery assigned a number between 1 and 1,000 to each combination of the last 3 ID digits. In this public lottery, balls numbered 1 to 1,000 were blindly extracted from a drum and assigned to each combination of the last 3 ID digits for all the males turning 18 years old in that year. The first ball released from the lottery drum corresponded to ID number 001, the second released ball to ID number 002, and so on. The random assignment was administered by the National Lottery and supervised by the National General Notary in a public session. The process was broadcasted live over the radio and the results widely disseminated through newspapers and printed media.

After the medical examinations were performed, a cutoff number was determined. Individuals whose ID had been assigned a lottery number lower than the cutoff were deemed exempt, and those with assigned lottery number equal to or higher than the cutoff (and who had also passed the medical examination) were mandatorily called to military conscription. In the population, 47.7% of men born between 1958 and 1975 were draft eligible, and approximately 60% of draft-eligible men were actually conscripted. Those individuals whose ID number was below the cut-off could serve as

⁵ For more details on military conscription in Argentina, see Rodriguez Molas (1983).

volunteers, though the number of volunteers was not high (in our cohorts, approximately 3.5%).⁶

IV. Data and the survey

We measure men's sexist attitudes and sexist behaviors using a confidential web-based survey conducted in April and May 2020.⁷ We hired a polling and market research firm that sent an e-mail invitation to participate in the survey to an e-mail list of approximately 29,500 men. To participate in the survey, men had to be born between 1958 and 1976, in Argentina. We received 1,289 completed and valid surveys, 1,219 for cohorts born between 1958 and 1975, and 70 for the cohort born in 1976. Our main analysis focuses on the cohorts born between 1958 and 1975, since the cohort born in 1976 faced the lottery but eventually was not drafted. While the response rate might seem low, it is very much in line with other online surveys that rely on impersonal, e-mail recruitment in Argentina (Ertola et. al 2020, Carreras et. al 2020). Several meta-analysis show that response rates below 10% are not uncommon for web surveys (Conrad et al. 2010; Muñoz-Leiva et al. 2010; Smyth and Pearson, 2011; Van Mol 2017).

The call to answer the survey did not mention military conscription or sexism.⁸ To encourage participation on the survey, participants were included in a raffle for smartphones. Participants entered the raffle with their last three ID digits. Asking for the last three ID digits to participate in raffles is a common practice in Argentina, so

⁶ Exemption to service was granted to clerics, seminarians, novitiates, to individuals with family members dependent upon him for support, to individuals having a younger brother in the same cohort, and to a few other exceptional cases. Deferment to finish high school or college was granted up to a maximum of 10 years until the completion of studies. Deferment was also granted without a particular reason for a maximum of 2 years. In these deferral cases, the lottery numbers and cutoffs used to decide eligibility were those of their cohort.

⁷ The English version of the survey is presented in the Appendix.

⁸ The English version of the recruitment e-mail is presented in the Appendix.

there is no reason to expect participants to associate the request of the last three ID digits with military conscription.

Survey questions

Our survey measures five metrics of attitudes (negative attitude towards homosexuality, justification of sexism and violence, sexual machismo, old fashioned sexism, and hostile sexism), and two metrics of intimate partner violence (non-physical abuse and physical violence). All metrics are constructed from a set of statements obtained from specialized literature: (i) the module on attitudes toward homosexuality consists of questions regarding the rights of homosexuals to marry or adopt children and whether homosexuals are “normal” or psychiatrically disturbed; (ii) the module on justification of sexism and violence comes from a survey that aims to capture different factors: domestic violence as a private matter, justification of violence as a reaction (victim’s fault), and defense of traditional sexist attitudes; (iii) sexual machismo is the belief that men are superior, which leads to sexual behaviors that could risk the sexual health and physical well-being of the individual and his partner. The module on sexual machismo aims to evaluate male sexist attitudes and beliefs from a sexual perspective; (iv) the module on hostile sexism aims to capture dominative paternalism and competitive gender differentiation, that in a more egalitarian social context, are reflected as resistance against women who want “too much” power (for example, feminists), and in the belief that women cannot succeed in men’s roles unless given preferential treatment; (v) the module on old-fashioned measures old-fashioned prejudices, endorsing traditional gender roles, unequal treatment, and stereotypes about lower female competence.⁹

⁹ The literature used to construct each metric is the following: justification of sexism and violence (Díaz-Aguado and Carvajal 2011), sexual machismo (Díaz Rodríguez, Rosas Rodríguez and González Ramírez 2010), negative attitude towards homosexuality (Zuckerman 1998), old-fashioned sexism (Swim et al.

We follow the literature and group the answers to get a single value for each metric. For question on attitudes, the respondents indicate how much they agree or disagree with each statement, on a scale ranging from “Totally disagree” to “Totally agree.” For questions on intimate partner violence, the respondents indicate the frequency on a scale ranging from “Never” to “Always.” In all cases, each question was scaled from 0 to 4, 0 to 5 or 0 to 7 depending on the original Likert scale used by the original authors. We constructed the 5 variables on attitudes by adding the scores on each dimension, as usually done in the literature. To have comparable scores, we divided each score by the maximum possible score in each dimension. In this way, we got a total score for each dimension ranging from 0 to 1 (i.e., an individual would have a score equal to 1 if she answered “Always” or “Totally agree” in all the questions of that dimension).

From the survey, we also obtained self-reported information on year of birth, conscription status (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for men who served, and zero otherwise), and pre-treatment characteristics: province of origin, parents’ education (no instruction or incomplete primary; complete primary school; complete high school; complete university or more), parents’ nationality (a dummy variable that takes the value one for Argentinian nationality, and zero otherwise), and father’s conscription status (a dummy variable that takes the value of one for men whose father served, and zero otherwise).

Using the self-reported last three ID digits, year of birth, military district, the lottery draft results, and the cut-off numbers by cohort, we construct the dummy variable *Draft eligible*, which takes the value of one for men whose last three ID digits

1995), hostile sexism (Glick and Fiske 1997), non-physical abuse (Garner and Hudson 1992), and physical violence (Straus et al. 1996).

obtained a lottery draft number above the cut-off, and zero otherwise. We also construct the treatment variable *Conscription*, which takes the value of one for men who report being conscripted, and zero otherwise.

Table 1 reports summary statistics of the data for cohorts 1958 to 1975. We allowed participants to skip questions on physical violence since they could feel upset or uncomfortable for revealing an illegal behavior. Five participants skipped that question.

We check the representativeness of the sample in all pre-treatment variables for which there is population information available. Table 2 compares our sample and the population in pre-treatment parents' nationality and pre-treatment province of origin. Population and sample proportions in parents' nationality are statistically indistinguishable from zero. For 20 out of 22 pre-treatment provinces of origin, the differences between population and sample proportions are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Finally, Figure 1 compares our sample and the population in pre-treatment parents' education. As observed in the figure, the population with low education is under-represented in our sample.

Still, external validity is likely to be a concern in a web-based survey, since people who are willing to respond to an email about a survey are likely to be different from the population in unobservable ways.

Interpretation of survey responses

The survey was anonymous and conducted online, so there is no reason to expect social stigma attached to particular responses or any changes in answers due to cues about what constitutes appropriate behavior.

A natural concern in online survey is potential selection into the sample. If selection into the sample were nonrandom, our estimated treatment effects might be

biased. For nonrandom selection into our sample to threaten the internal validity of our estimates, the selection would need to be differential by draft-eligibility status. We test for differential selection into the survey by draft-eligibility status in five ways.

First, we examine whether the sample proportion of draft-eligible in our sample is similar to the population proportion. Table 3 reports population and sample proportions of draft eligibility, by cohort. For the 17 out of 18 cohorts, the difference between population and sample proportions of draft-eligible is statistically indistinguishable from zero.

Second, we check whether the sample distribution of the last three ID digits in our sample is similar to the population (uniform) distribution. In Figure 2, we display the sample distribution of the last three ID digits, grouping the last three ID digits in bins of 100 consecutive numbers (10 bins of 100 numbers each). The sample distribution looks like a uniform distribution, and we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sample distribution of the last three ID digits is statistically not different from a uniform distribution.

Third, we check whether the sample distribution of the lottery numbers in our sample is similar to the population (uniform) distribution. Again, we first display the sample distribution of the lottery number, grouped in bins of 100 consecutive numbers. As shown in Figure 3, the sample distribution of the lottery numbers looks like a uniform distribution. In addition, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sample distribution is statistically not different from a uniform distribution.

Fourth, even though eligibility to serve in the conscription was randomly determined, we examine whether individuals' pre-treatment characteristics are balanced across the draft-eligible and the draft-exempted groups within our sample. Table 4 reports differences in parents' education, parents' nationality, and whether his

father served in the conscription, by draft-eligibility status. For 10 out of 11 pre-treatment characteristics available, there are no statistically significant differences between the draft-eligible and the draft-exempted groups. In addition, Table 5 reports differences, by draft-eligibility status, in the pre-treatment province of origin. For all the 22 pre-treatment provinces of origin, there are no statistically significant differences between the draft-eligible and the draft-exempted groups.¹⁰

Fifth, we look at within-survey attrition. The proportion of those that started the survey but did not complete it is low (9.10%). In addition, attrition is orthogonal to draft-eligibility assignment: the proportion of attrition is 9.40% in the draft-eligible group, 8.84% in the draft-exempted group, and the difference between these two proportions is statistically not significant.

Since (i) population and sample proportion of draft-eligible are statistically indistinguishable, (ii) the sample distribution of the last three ID digits is statistically not different from the population (uniform) distribution, (iii) the sample distribution of lottery numbers is statistically not different from the population (uniform) distribution, (iv) pre-treatment characteristics are balanced within our sample, and (v) attrition is low and orthogonal to draft-eligibility status, we conclude results reported below are not subject to significant sources of selection bias.¹¹

V. Econometric methods and results

We examine the causal effect of conscription on sexism in a regression framework. Formally, we want to estimate the following equation:

¹⁰ The F-statistic p-value of the regression of draft-eligibility status on the set of pre-treatment characteristics is 0.96.

¹¹ Our survey data was collected at the time of a national lockdown implemented in Argentina with the objective to prevent the spread of the coronavirus. The lockdown took place in an environment where few people really felt threatened by the disease. As a consequence of the lockdown, some men were placed in quarantine while others were not (in our sample, 65% of men report being in quarantine). Important for identification purposes, quarantine status is orthogonal to draft-eligibility assignment.

$$Y_{ic} = \beta + \alpha \text{Conscription}_{ic} + \gamma X_{ic} + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ic} \quad (1)$$

where Y_{ic} is a given outcome for individual i from birth cohort c , *Conscription* is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for those individuals who served, X_{ic} is a vector of individuals' pre-treatment characteristics, δ_c is a cohort fixed effect, and ε_{ic} is an error term. The coefficient of interest is α , which we expect to be positive for all outcomes. In all estimates, we cluster standard errors at the ID-cohort level.

The outcomes are sexist attitudes, non-physical abuse, and physical violence. In order to draw general conclusions in the context of multiple metrics on sexist attitudes, we construct an index that aggregates the five metrics. The index of sexist attitudes is a weighted mean of several standardized outcomes. The weights are calculated to maximize the amount of information captured in the index (for more details, see Anderson 2008 and Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 2012). A higher score is associated with being more sexist. We also report effects on each separate metric.

Conscription may be endogenous in equation (1) due to reverse causality, self-selection, and unobserved heterogeneity. To address potential endogeneity biases, we estimate equation (1) by Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS), where we use *Draft eligible* as an instrument for *Conscription*. The 2SLS estimator recovers the average treatment effect for draft-lottery compliers, that is, for those who served in the military because they were assigned a high lottery number but would not have served otherwise. Thus, 2SLS estimates do not generalize to the population of volunteers or to the population of young men who, under no circumstances, would have passed the pre-induction medical examination.

Table 6 reports first-stage estimates, with and without controls. The point estimates of the coefficients on *Draft eligible* indicate that the probability of being conscripted is 37.9 percentage points higher for men in the draft-eligible group than for

those in the draft-ineligible group. First-stage effects are precisely estimated and significantly different from zero.¹²

As a benchmark, in panel A of Table 7, we report OLS estimates of equation (1). OLS estimates indicate that men who served have more sexist attitudes than those that did not serve. This result holds for the index of sexist attitudes and all of its separate metrics.¹³ To address concerns about multiple hypotheses testing, we report p-values that are adjusted using the false discovery rate procedure (Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli 2006; Anderson 2008).

Panel B in Table 7 reports our main (2SLS) estimates. The estimated coefficient in column (1) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that being conscripted significantly increases sexist attitudes.¹⁴ To determine whether the effects of military conscription on sexist attitudes are wide-ranging or concentrated on a few outcomes, we estimate the effects on each separate metric. The effect appears quite general. For all five metrics, the point estimates have the expected signs, and 4 of them are statistically significant. The size differences among sexist attributes are important. Regarding 2SLS estimates, sexual machismo is 0.33 standard deviations higher for conscripted men, old-fashioned sexism is 0.40 standard deviations higher, hostile sexism is 0.32 standard deviations higher, and the probability of justifying violent behaviors goes up by 0.50 standard deviations for conscripted men. The

¹² Our first-stage estimates are similar to the ones reported in Ertola Navajas et al. (2020) and smaller to the ones reported in Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011). While Ertola Navajas et al. (2020) use the same cohorts as we do (1958 to 1975), Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011) analysis is restricted to cohorts 1958 to 1962. If we restrict to cohorts 1958 to 1962, our first-stage estimates are similar to the ones in Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrodsky (2011).

¹³ Table A2 in the Appendix reports reduced-form estimates of the impact of military conscription on sexist attitudes and Intimate partner violence.

¹⁴ In all cases, we obtain similar results in regression models without controls (see Table A3 in the Appendix).

percentage increase with respect to the mean of the non-conscripted men is 35%, 52%, 16%, and 70%, respectively.¹⁵

We then take a step further and we ask whether military conscription increases intimate partner violence. As shown in Table 8, the answer is yes. Men who were conscripted are more prone to self-report engagement in non-physical abuse and physical violence. The size differences are important. Non-physical abuse and physical violence are 0.48 standard deviations higher for conscripted men.

Further results

Even though our study relies on well-documented randomization, we try a placebo experiment to test further the exogeneity of our instrument. To do so, we take advantage of the fact that the cohort of 1976 faced the lottery but eventually was not drafted.¹⁶ We create a fake cut-off number for this cohort using the cut-off number for the cohort of 1975. We then compare outcomes for those with “high” and “low” numbers, and we find no differences between the two groups: the coefficient for the fake dummy for being draft-eligible is statistically not significant for all outcomes (see Table 9), and most of the coefficients are small and with the opposite sign.

This placebo exercise also addresses the potential concern that the outcome of the lottery could have a direct effect on misogynistic attitudes and behavior through mechanisms other than military conscription.

We also explore whether the duration of exposure to military conscription increases probability of having more sexist attitudes. As previously noted, the length

¹⁵ Currently the statement “I demand that my partner perform sexual acts that she does not like” is grouped as a component of non-physical abuse. Since it can be argued that sexual violence is a separate category, in Table A4 in the Appendix we report separate results for this metric. We report OLS, reduced-form, and 2SLS estimates, and in all cases the coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant.

¹⁶ The lottery for the cohort born in 1976 took place on May 27, 1994, but conscription was abolished in December 1994.

of service was approximately one year in the Army and the Air Force, and up to two years in the Navy, and the assignment to the Army, the Air Force and the Navy was random. Since we do not have information about in which force the individual actually served, we report intention-to-treat estimates. As shown in Table 10, the differential effect of conscription on sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence is positive for those who were randomly assigned to serve in the Navy. The estimated differential effects, however, are in most cases statistically not significant.¹⁷

Interpreting the treatment effect

Military conscription may affect intermediate outcomes (e.g., criminal records, as in Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrotsky 2011) that themselves may play a causal role in shaping attitudes and behavior. An effect of randomly assigned conscription on misogynistic attitudes and behavior working through changed criminal records (or other channels) would have quite a different interpretation from the effect working through military exposure alone. Therefore, identifying a pure “military exposure effect” is challenging.

Even though our natural experiment does not identify the mechanisms through which military conscription affects misogynistic attitudes and violent behavior, the magnitudes of our estimated effects compared to the ones in Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrotsky (2011) suggest that the change in misogynistic attitudes and violent behavior found here cannot be explained by the increase in criminal records alone. Galiani, Rossi, and Schargrotsky (2011) also document that conscripted men perform poorly in the labor market due to the loss of labor market experience compared to peers. Potentially, this implies that conscripted men may match with potentially different

¹⁷ We constructed a dummy “Dictatorship” that takes the value 1 for those cohorts that served during dictatorship (cohorts 1958 to 1965), and we explore potential differential effects according to whether men served during democracy or military dictatorship. In all cases, the coefficient of the interaction effect is positive, but in most cases it is statistically not significant (see Table A5 in the Appendix).

types of women, or that the quality of the match may be inferior compared to the non-conscripted men.

An additional issue on the interpretation of our findings is related to the fact that we are asking survey respondents to self-report on their own abuse of domestic partners. As usual with self-reported data, the assumption is that reporting is orthogonal to the assignment. In our case, this assumption may be challenge if conscripted men are less likely to lie about their sexist attitudes and behaviors, for example, because they feel more self-confident and do not worry about any legal consequences of their reports.¹⁸ In addition, military conscription may increase awareness and legitimacy of violent behaviors and may change the extent of reporting as opposed to the actual incidence of the underlying phenomenon of interest. This is an important issue, and it is the reason why many relevant papers in the field of domestic violence (like Aizer 2010 or Card and Dahl 2011) use objective measures of violence that are not subject to self-reporting bias, such as female hospitalizations for assault and police reports of violence. Unfortunately, we do not have data from police or hospital reports to capture the real extent of intimate partner violence.

VI. Final remarks

We provide novel evidence on the role military conscription has on subsequent men's sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence. Our empirical strategy combines administrative data on the conscription lottery in Argentina with self-administered survey data. We find strong evidence that military experience in the conscription causes men to adopt more misogynistic attitudes and to report engaging in more acts of

¹⁸ Some authors argue that since violence and power are elements of military normality, domestic violence could be legitimated by its socially constructed gender relations, and this might lead to higher reporting. On the other hand, the military culture makes a strong separation between public and private practices, and domestic abuse is a form of violence which could be 'continually privatised' (see Gray 2016).

domestic abuse. The magnitudes of the estimated effects are both statistically significant and quite large.

Our findings have important policy implications. Many countries (mostly European, such as Italy, Romania, France, and Germany) are currently evaluating the reintroduction of some kind of military conscription as a policy tool to address multiple purposes, such as producing men that can potentially serve in military conflicts, keeping young men off the streets (so to reduce involvement in criminal activity), improving young men subsequent inclusion into society, etc. Taking into account external validity concerns, our results may be informative of the overall effects of this policy tool.

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Table 1. Summary statistics

	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Conscription	1,219	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Draft eligible	1,219	0.46	0.50	0.00	1.00
Negative attitude towards homosexuality	1,219	0.27	0.26	0.00	1.00
Hostile sexism	1,219	0.48	0.23	0.00	1.00
Old-fashioned sexism	1,219	0.15	0.18	0.00	1.00
Justification of violence	1,219	0.13	0.16	0.00	1.00
Sexual machismo	1,219	0.17	0.17	0.00	1.00
Index of sexist attitudes	1,219	0.07	0.84	-1.26	4.26
Physical violence	1,214	0.01	0.04	0.00	0.56
Non-physical abuse	1,219	0.09	0.12	0.00	0.83
Father's country of birth	1,219	0.88	0.32	0.00	1.00
Mother's country of birth	1,219	0.91	0.29	0.00	1.00
Father served in conscription	1,219	0.62	0.49	0.00	1.00
Father: no instruction or incomplete primary	1,219	0.12	0.33	0.00	1.00
Father: complete primary school	1,219	0.31	0.46	0.00	1.00
Father: complete high school	1,219	0.26	0.44	0.00	1.00
Father: complete university or more	1,219	0.28	0.45	0.00	1.00
Mother: no instruction or incomplete primary	1,219	0.12	0.32	0.00	1.00
Mother: complete primary school	1,219	0.35	0.48	0.00	1.00
Mother: complete high school	1,219	0.29	0.45	0.00	1.00
Mother: complete university or more	1,219	0.24	0.42	0.00	1.00

Table 2. Representativeness: parents' nationality and province of origin

	Population proportion	Sample proportion	Difference
<i>Parents' nationality</i>			
Father's country of birth	0.896	0.884	0.013
Mother's country of birth	0.917	0.906	0.010
<i>Province of origin</i>			
Buenos Aires	0.500	0.554	-0.054***
Catamarca	0.008	0.005	0.003
Chaco	0.025	0.019	0.006
Chubut	0.010	0.009	0.001
Cordoba	0.075	0.071	0.004
Corrientes	0.024	0.018	0.006
Entre Rios	0.033	0.026	0.007
Formosa	0.011	0.007	0.004
Jujuy	0.015	0.011	0.004
La Pampa	0.008	0.008	-0.000
La Rioja	0.006	0.005	0.001
Mendoza	0.043	0.041	0.002
Misiones	0.021	0.016	0.005
Neuquen	0.009	0.009	-0.000
Rio Negro	0.014	0.019	-0.005
Salta	0.024	0.023	0.001
San Juan	0.017	0.012	0.005
San Luis	0.008	0.006	0.002
Santa Cruz	0.005	0.005	0.000
Santa Fe	0.089	0.084	0.005
Santiago del Estero	0.022	0.015	0.007**
Tucuman	0.035	0.039	-0.004

Notes: Data obtained from Argentine Census 2010. Santa Cruz includes the former National Territory of Tierra del Fuego. Buenos Aires includes both the city and the province. The number of observations in the sample is 1,219. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table 3. Draft-eligibility status, by cohort

Cohort	Sample size	Population proportion of draft eligible	Sample proportion of draft eligible	Difference
1958	42	0.827	0.833	0.006
1959	74	0.682	0.716	0.034
1960	64	0.661	0.578	-0.083
1961	80	0.652	0.563	-0.090
1962	66	0.682	0.742	0.060
1963	57	0.652	0.596	-0.056
1964	66	0.602	0.621	0.019
1965	65	0.620	0.523	-0.097
1966	64	0.391	0.438	0.046
1967	60	0.326	0.283	-0.043
1968	65	0.410	0.385	-0.025
1969	62	0.442	0.532	0.090
1970	70	0.505	0.486	-0.019
1971	76	0.257	0.355	0.098*
1972	77	0.179	0.169	-0.010
1973	71	0.236	0.324	0.088
1974	80	0.219	0.188	-0.032
1975	80	0.243	0.200	-0.043
Total	1,219	0.477	0.459	-0.018

Notes: The population of draft eligible by cohort was obtained from the Argentine Army. *Significant at the 10% level.

Table 4. Pre-treatment characteristics, by draft-eligibility assignment

	Draft eligible mean	Non draft eligible mean	Difference
Father's country of birth	0.878 (0.327)	0.888 (0.316)	-0.010 [0.018]
Mother's country of birth	0.909 (0.288)	0.905 (0.294)	0.004 [0.017]
Father served in conscription	0.610 (0.488)	0.621 (0.485)	-0.011 [0.028]
Father: no instruction or incomplete primary	0.131 (0.337)	0.118 (0.323)	0.012 [0.019]
Father: complete primary school	0.326 (0.469)	0.302 (0.459)	0.024 [0.027]
Father: complete high school	0.249 (0.433)	0.271 (0.445)	-0.023 [0.025]
Father: complete university or more	0.272 (0.445)	0.285 (0.452)	-0.013 [0.026]
Mother: no instruction or incomplete primary	0.118 (0.323)	0.115 (0.319)	0.003 [0.018]
Mother: complete primary school	0.363 (0.481)	0.335 (0.472)	0.028 [0.027]
Mother: complete high school	0.301 (0.459)	0.277 (0.448)	0.023 [0.026]
Mother: complete university or more	0.208 (0.406)	0.261 (0.439)	-0.053** [0.024]

Notes: Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are shown in brackets. The total number of observations is 1,219. **Significant at the 5% level.

Table 5. Province of origin, by draft-eligibility assignment

	Draft eligible mean	Non draft eligible mean	Difference
Buenos Aires	0.562 (0.497)	0.547 (0.498)	0.015 [0.029]
Catamarca	0.005 (0.073)	0.005 (0.067)	0.001 [0.004]
Chaco	0.014 (0.119)	0.023 (0.149)	-0.008 [0.008]
Chubut	0.013 (0.111)	0.006 (0.078)	0.006 [0.005]
Cordoba	0.061 (0.239)	0.079 (0.270)	-0.018 [0.015]
Corrientes	0.021 (0.145)	0.015 (0.122)	0.006 [0.008]
Entre Rios	0.027 (0.162)	0.026 (0.159)	0.001 [0.009]
Formosa	0.007 (0.084)	0.008 (0.087)	-0.000 [0.005]
Jujuy	0.014 (0.119)	0.008 (0.087)	0.007 [0.006]
La Pampa	0.009 (0.094)	0.008 (0.087)	0.001 [0.005]
La Rioja	0.005 (0.073)	0.005 (0.067)	0.001 [0.004]
Mendoza	0.047 (0.211)	0.036 (0.187)	0.010 [0.011]
Misiones	0.013 (0.111)	0.018 (0.134)	-0.006 [0.007]
Neuquen	0.013 (0.111)	0.006 (0.078)	0.006 [0.005]
Rio Negro	0.013 (0.111)	0.024 (0.154)	-0.012 [0.008]
Salta	0.025 (0.156)	0.021 (0.144)	0.004 [0.009]
San Juan	0.011 (0.103)	0.014 (0.116)	-0.003 [0.006]
San Luis	0.005 (0.073)	0.006 (0.078)	-0.001 [0.004]
Santa Cruz	0.005 (0.073)	0.005 (0.067)	0.001 [0.004]
Santa Fe	0.077 (0.267)	0.089 (0.286)	-0.012 [0.016]
Santiago del Estero	0.016 (0.126)	0.014 (0.116)	0.002 [0.007]
Tucuman	0.038 (0.190)	0.039 (0.195)	-0.002 [0.011]

Notes: Santa Cruz includes the former National Territory of Tierra del Fuego. Buenos Aires includes both the city and the province. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses. Standard errors are shown in brackets. The total number of observations is 1,219.

Table 6. First-stage estimates

	Conscription	
	(1)	(2)
Draft eligible	0.379*** (0.024)	0.377*** (0.024)
F-Test	232.13 {0.00}	231.42 {0.00}
Controls	No	Yes
Observations	1,219	1,219

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models are estimated by OLS and include cohort dummies. The set of controls includes province of origin dummies and all variables listed in Table 4. F-test is the F-test of excluded instruments (p-values are shown in braces). ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table 7. Impact of conscription on sexist attitudes

Panel A	Index of sexist attitudes (1)	Negative attitude towards homosexuality (2)	Sexual machismo (3)	Justification of sexism & violence (4)	Old-fashioned sexism (5)	Hostile sexism (6)
Conscription	0.322*** (0.069)	0.048** (0.019)	0.050*** (0.014)	0.055*** (0.013)	0.071*** (0.015)	0.060*** (0.017)
FDR-p-value	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219

Panel B	Index of sexist attitudes (7)	Negative attitude towards homosexuality (8)	Sexual machismo (9)	Justification of sexism & violence (10)	Old-fashioned sexism (11)	Hostile sexism (12)
Conscription	0.366*** (0.135)	0.047 (0.043)	0.056** (0.028)	0.080*** (0.025)	0.073** (0.029)	0.074* (0.040)
FDR-p-value	(0.018)	(0.080)	(0.034)	(0.009)	(0.022)	(0.039)
Mean of dependent variable	0.07	0.27	0.17	0.13	0.15	0.48
Estimation method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. FDR-p-values are False Discovery Rates adjusted p-values, following the procedure in Benjamini, Krieger, and Yekutieli (2006) and Anderson (2008). All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. In 2SLS models, Conscription is instrumented using Draft eligible. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table 8. Impact of conscription on intimate partner violence

	Non-physical abuse (1)	Physical violence (2)	Non-physical abuse (3)	Physical violence (4)
Conscription	0.033*** (0.010)	0.010** (0.004)	0.056*** (0.019)	0.020** (0.008)
Mean of dependent variable	0.09	0.01	0.09	0.01
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	1,219	1,214	1,219	1,214

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. In 2SLS models, Conscription is instrumented using Draft eligible. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table 9. Placebo regression: cohort that faced the draft lottery but eventually was not drafted

	Index of sexist attitudes	Negative attitude towards homosexuality	Sexual machismo	Justification of sexism & violence	Old- fashioned sexism	Hostile sexism	Non-physical abuse	Physical violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Draft eligible	-0.066 (0.194)	0.008 (0.066)	0.008 (0.035)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.019 (0.033)	-0.048 (0.064)	-0.011 (0.014)	-0.003 (0.002)
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Controls	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Observations	70	70	70	70	70	70	69	68


Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses.

Table 10. Further results: duration of the exposure to military conscription

	Index of sexist attitudes	Negative attitude towards homosexuality	Sexual machismo	Justification of sexism & violence	Old- fashioned sexism	Hostile sexism	Non-physical abuse	Physical violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Draft eligible	0.100* (0.054)	0.011 (0.017)	0.016 (0.011)	0.024** (0.010)	0.019 (0.012)	0.021 (0.016)	0.017** (0.008)	0.007** (0.003)
Draft eligible*Navy	0.219* (0.121)	0.040 (0.031)	0.031 (0.025)	0.037 (0.022)	0.047* (0.026)	0.042 (0.028)	0.025 (0.018)	0.002 (0.005)
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,214

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. Navy is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for draftees that were randomly assigned to serve in the Navy (2 years), and 0 for draftees that were randomly assigned to serve either in the Army or in the Air Force (1 year). *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level.

Figure 1. Representativeness: parents' education



Notes: Data obtained from Argentine Census 2010 (education 60+ year-old men and women in 2010).

Figure 2. Distribution of the last three ID digits in our sample





Figure 3. Distribution of the lottery numbers in our sample



Appendix

Invitation to answer the survey

We invite you to participate in an investigation about the relationship between men and women in society. This is a strictly academic project directed by a team of researchers from Universidad de San Andrés and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Answering this survey should take you about 15 minutes. Your answers are completely anonymous. After completing the questionnaire you will be given a code with which you will be participating in the raffle for a Samsung Galaxy A20 on May 31st, 2020. At the end of the survey, we will give you the details to participate in the raffle.

Survey

Personal information

1. Year of birth.
2. Province in which he lived at age 17.
3. Father's country of birth.
4. Father's maximum level of education.
5. Mather's country of birth.
6. Mather's maximum level of education.
7. Did your father do military conscription?
8. Last 3 ID digits.

Attitudes

a) Homosexuality aversion

9. Homosexuals (male or female) should have the right to legally marry.
10. Homosexual couples (male or female) should have the right to adopt children.
11. Nearly all homosexuals are psychiatrically disturbed.
12. Except for differences in sexual preference, homosexuals are as normal as heterosexuals.

b) Hostile sexism

13. Many women are actually seeking special favors, such as hiring policies that favor them over men, under the guise of asking for "equality."
14. Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts as being sexist.
15. Feminists are making entirely reasonable demands to men.

c) Old-fashioned sexism

16. Women are generally not as smart as men.
17. I would be equally comfortable having a woman as a boss as a man.
18. It is more important to encourage boys than to encourage girls to participate in athletics.
19. Women are just as capable of thinking logically as men.
20. When both parents are employed and their child gets sick at school, the school should call the mother rather than the father.

d) Sexual machismo

21. That only the man has sex before marriage.
22. That a married man or stable partner has sex with prostitutes.
23. A woman must accept the infidelities of her partner.
24. The man needs to have several sexual partners at the same time.
25. Regardless of the situation or mood, the woman must have sexual relationships when her partner wants to have them.
26. The man must make his male son start his sex life (have his first sexual relationship).

e) Justification of sexism and violence

27. Violence that occurs within the home is a family matter and should not be disclosed to anyone outside the home.

28. When a woman is attacked by her husband, she probably has done something to provoke him.
29. A man is justified in assaulting his wife or girlfriend when she decides to leave him.
30. If a woman is abused by her partner and does not leave him, it is because she does not dislike the situation as much.
31. For the sake of her children, a woman that has to endure violence from her husband or partner, she should not report it.
32. In order to have a good relationship, it is desirable that the woman avoids disagreeing with her male partner.
33. A good father should let the rest of his family know who is in charge.

Physical violence

34. I threw something at my partner that could have hurt her.
35. I pushed my partner violently.
36. I beat up my partner.

Non-physical abuse

37. I insulted my partner.
38. I destroyed something that belonged to my partner.
39. I make fun of my partner's poor ability to do things.
40. I expect my partner to obey me.
41. I get very upset and angry if my partner says I've had too much to drink.
42. I demand that my partner perform sexual acts that she does not like.
43. I carefully control the money I give to my partner.
44. I don't want my partner to have any male friends.
45. I tell my partner that she is ugly or fat.
46. I don't want my partner to work or go to school.
47. I don't want my partner to socialize with her friends.

Table A1. Results excluding cohorts 1962 and 1963 (some draftees participated in the Malvinas war)

	Index of sexist attitudes	Negative attitude towards homosexuality	Sexual machismo	Justification of sexism & violence	Old- fashioned sexism	Hostile sexism	Non-physical abuse	Physical violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	0.444*** (0.151)	0.074 (0.048)	0.055* (0.031)	0.101*** (0.028)	0.074** (0.033)	0.107** (0.043)	0.062*** (0.022)	0.024*** (0.009)
Estimation method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,096	1,092

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. In 2SLS models, Conscription is instrumented using Draft eligible. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table A2. Reduced-form estimates of the impact of conscription on sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence

	Index of sexist attitudes	Negative attitude towards homosexuality	Sexual machismo	Justification of sexism & violence	Old- fashioned sexism	Hostile sexism	Non-physical abuse	Physical violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Draft eligible	0.138*** (0.053)	0.018 (0.017)	0.021* (0.011)	0.030*** (0.010)	0.027** (0.011)	0.028* (0.015)	0.021*** (0.007)	0.007** (0.003)
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,214

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table A3. 2SLS estimates of the impact of conscription on sexist attitudes and intimate partner violence, without controls

	Index of sexist attitudes	Negative attitude towards homosexuality	Sexual machismo	Justification of sexism & violence	Old- fashioned sexism	Hostile sexism	Non-physical abuse	Physical violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	0.375*** (0.144)	0.038 (0.044)	0.050* (0.028)	0.077*** (0.026)	0.071** (0.030)	0.069* (0.040)	0.053*** (0.020)	0.020** (0.008)
Estimation method	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS	2SLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,214

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies. Conscription is instrumented using Draft eligible. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table A4. Impact of conscription on sexual violence

	Sexual violence		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Conscription	0.088*** (0.026)		0.119** (0.056)
Draft eligible		0.045** (0.022)	
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	2SLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. Sexual violence takes the value 0 if the response to the statement “I demand that my partner perform sexual acts that she does not like” was “never”, and 1 otherwise. All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. In the 2SLS model, Conscription is instrumented using Draft eligible. **Significant at the 5% level. ***Significant at the 1% level.

Table A5. Further results: differential effects between serving in democracy or military dictatorship

	Index of sexist attitudes	Negative attitude towards homosexuality	Sexual machismo	Justification of sexism & violence	Old- fashioned sexism	Hostile sexism	Non-physical abuse	Physical violence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Draft eligible	0.073 (0.066)	0.008 (0.021)	0.009 (0.013)	0.017 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	0.026 (0.021)	0.010 (0.010)	0.006 (0.004)
Draft eligible* Dictatorship	0.145 (0.106)	0.023 (0.034)	0.027 (0.022)	0.030 (0.020)	0.044* (0.023)	0.004 (0.031)	0.025* (0.015)	0.003 (0.005)
Estimation method	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Observations	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,219	1,214

Notes: Standard errors clustered at the ID-cohort level are shown in parentheses. All models include cohort dummies, province of origin dummies, and the set of pre-treatment characteristics listed in Table 4. Dictatorship is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for draftees that served during military dictatorship (cohorts 1958 to 1965), and 0 otherwise. *Significant at the 10% level. **Significant at the 5% level.